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Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA)
Government Intervention: Start of a Corrective Process - No Quick Fix
The passage of the revised Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA), which includes the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP), did not immediately
ease interbank lending but is expected to begin
relieving financial sector uncertainty and the logjam in
the commercial paper market in the months ahead.
Lenders and investors have so far looked beyond the
passage of the rescue bill and focused more on
evidence of further economic weakness and financial
sector troubles, which are now spreading through
Europe. Since the legislation passed, a massive
equities selloff has ensued globally. Borrowing from
the Fed by commercial banks and bond dealers increased 60 percent last week to $348 billion, exceeding
levels reached after the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the three-month LIBOR rate rose to 4.33 percent, up
from 4.21 percent, showing that banks are still hoarding cash. Although it will take time to work through,
the government measure is a critical first step in thawing credit markets.
Aside from the philosophical and political debate regarding why the financial system is in crisis, a
systemic solution was required to reverse the domino effect of ballooning uncertainty in the global
financial system. The time pressure to pass a broad-based measure became a factor of containing the
degree of uncertainty among banks, restoring interbank lending and reducing investor pessimism; these
factors have led to a near stoppage of capital flows in recent weeks.
The Fed and Treasury Department’s attempt at one-off fixes to address the rapid de-leveraging of
financial markets and unwinding of troubled assets eventually gave way to a broad-based rescue plan. The package has been controversial from the start due to the potential taxpayer liability and has
sweeping implications for future regulation; however, the depth of the issues left the Fed and Treasury
Department with little immediate choice.
While the broad-based rescue package is not an end-all solution to the current crisis, it represents a
critical first step in stabilizing the financial system globally. Due to the complexity of financial
instruments used in recent years and the interconnectedness of the financial sector globally, the true
magnitude of potential risk in the marketplace will remain difficult to quantify for some time. This
creates a question as to whether the $700 billion rescue package will ultimately be enough.
The delay in passing a rescue package did have implications for the commercial real estate market aside
from just exacerbating financing constraints. These include the potential damage to the economy above
and beyond what would have been the course of the unfolding downturn. This is the result of the credit
freeze on commercial paper and other forms of short-term financing that companies of all sizes rely
upon.
The EESA is aimed at addressing the hundreds of billions of dollars of illiquid assets clogging the
financial system through TARP.
The legislation passed by Congress will fund the $700 billion rescue
package in installments. Furthermore, an oversight committee will be created and salary curbs are to be
placed on compensation packages for executives of companies that sell assets to the Treasury. The EESA
also includes tax cuts for businesses and households, and provisions to reduce potential taxpayer
liability, such as a plan to recoup any net losses to the taxpayers directly from the financial industry after
five years. It also increases the FDIC’s guarantee on covered deposits to $250,000. In addition, the EESA
restates the SEC’s authority to suspend mark-to-market accounting if it deems necessary. If this practice
is suspended, institutions would be able to avoid using fire-sale pricing in their accounting for some
difficult-to-trade assets, potentially reducing writedowns in the short term.
The EESA will not stave off insolvency for all institutions, as the number of banks on the FDIC’s watch
list is on the rise, increasing from 90 in the first quarter to 117 in the second quarter. The number of
additional institutions that will face liquidity issues is likely to be greater.
- The TARP portion of the EESA is aimed at troubled assets – mostly mortgage-related – that are
difficult to price and trade, and have ended up weighing down institutions’ balance sheets.
- The government has the capacity to purchase these investments from financial institutions and hold
them until the market thaws. It is most likely to use a reverse auction to allow institutions to compete
in their pricing and sale of assets. Theoretically, this approach could result in some level of returns for
taxpayers or at least minimize the downside. The post-9/11 bailout of the airline industry ultimately
netted taxpayers an estimated $130 million, while the Chrysler bailout in the late 1970s resulted in a
$300 million return for the Treasury.
- Once credit markets recover, the government ideally would be able to sell the assets purchased as
part of the TARP, recouping some portion of the taxpayers’ investment. As a result, the ultimate cost
of the plan to taxpayers is unknown. As a point of reference, once the clean-up of the Savings & Loan
(S&L) crisis was complete at the end of the 1990s, the total cost to taxpayers was approximately $124
billion, or approximately $268 billion adjusted for inflation. The current financial crisis is greater in
magnitude due to the complexity of its drivers. While the run-up in the housing market and the
ensuing downturn are at the root of current problems, the total scale of the crisis remains unknown
due to the complex financial instruments and derivatives that were used in recent years.
The government has become more cautious about bailouts for individual firms, but it is making
extraordinary efforts to restore liquidity and shore up confidence in the broader financial markets.
- The Fed has been instrumental in coordinating global support for the economy and financial system
from foreign central banks. The Fed recently increased its currency swap lines, providing foreign
central banks with greater access to U.S. dollars. In addition, central banks around the globe have
been pumping liquidity into the marketplace in an attempt to ease interbank lending rates and
liquidity concerns. These measures will only work if banks return to normalized lending.
- By refusing to rescue Lehman Brothers, the Fed and Treasury Department sent a message that the
government was not a one-off bailout facility for every ailing financial company; unfortunately,
Lehman’s collapse may have increased the magnitude of the current crisis since many funds and
major institutions had significant exposure to the firm. Although the government proceeded to rescue
American Insurance Group (AIG), it did so based on its assessment that the company’s collapse could
have caused significant devastation to the global financial system.
Economy and Financial Markets
The U.S. economy – already facing significant
headwinds – will be further challenged by the
latest turmoil in financial markets.
- Financial sector job losses will be greater
than anticipated, particularly in New York
and other markets with high concentrations
of financial activities employment. Most
companies entered the economic downturn
relatively lean, and job cuts were below
trend until recently; September figures
reflected further economic weakening with
the loss of 159,000 positions, the largest
monthly decline since 2003.
- The latest woes on Wall Street and
throughout the global financial system have exacerbated the credit crunch, further limiting the
availability of credit to businesses and consumers, which in turn will hinder spending. Lowerrated
companies will face much greater difficulty securing short-term funding, while even highly
rated corporations have experienced a run-up in borrowing costs. During the week beginning
with the Merrill Lynch and Lehman announcements, the volume of commercial paper
outstanding contracted by more than $52 billion, its greatest weekly decline recorded year to date.
- Exports, which have helped to offset the drag of housing on the U.S. economy, are likely to slow
as the global economy downshifts, reducing demand for goods and services worldwide.
- A large share of the economic stimulus checks were spent in the second quarter, leaving minimal
support for third and fourth quarter GDP. The recent meltdown on Wall Street and its effects on
the economy may place more pressure on the government to consider another round of stimulus
by early next year.
On the positive side, oil prices are again well below peak levels registered earlier this summer, which
should give the Fed more flexibility as inflationary pressures ease. The headline rate of inflation
declined slightly in August due to falling energy prices, and September inflation figures should
reflect further easing if the dollar and oil prices stabilize in the near term. Many investors in oil
futures who relied on borrowed money are being forced out of the market as credit availability
tightens. Furthermore, investors are increasingly fearful that financial market turmoil will result in
additional slowing of the global economy, thereby reducing overall demand for oil.
Long-term interest rates are low again, as investors continue to flock to the safety of U.S. Treasurys
amid growing economic uncertainty. Following the Lehman and Merrill Lynch announcements and
due to post-bailout jitters, the yield on the 10-year Treasury slipped below 3.5 percent; however, it
has fluctuated in a band of approximately 40 basis points in recent weeks, as investors have been
quick to react to changing conditions. Long-term rates are expected to normalize between 4.0 percent
and 4.5 percent once the current crisis passes. However, the benefit of low rates will not be felt until
banks and other institutions begin lending again.
Uncertainty is causing significant volatility in financial markets despite the Securities & Exchange
Commission’s temporary ban on short-selling of nearly 800 financial stocks. Failures of top financial
institutions at rapid rates have injected a new level of fear into the marketplace, creating an
environment where investors will continue to act quickly to avoid further losses.
| Credit Crisis, Wall Street Turmoil Weighing on Stocks (S&P 500) |
| |
| | Decline in % | Decline in Points |
| | (Event to Trough) | (Event to Trough) |
| 1929: Depression* | -87% | 164 |
| 1973-74: Oil Embargo | -40% | 45 |
| 1987: Stock Market Crash | -21% | 58 |
| 1998: Global Financial Crisis | -19% | 227 |
| 2000-01: Dot-Com Bust & 9/11 Tragedies | -44% | 607 |
| 2007-08 Credit Crisis** | -32% | 497 |
| |
| *Depression statistics based on DJIA |
| **Pre-crisis peak 7/19/07 to 10/6/08 (not necessarily the trough) |
The Chicago Board of Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), which measures the expected
volatility of S&P 500 index options over the
next 30 days, recently increased to a record
high, surpassing its previous peak reached
when the markets re-opened following the
9/11 tragedies. The index first spiked
following the rejection of the initial version of
the EESA by the House of Representatives
but rose to a higher level after the passage of
the revised rescue package, as concerns
regarding the state of the global economy
intensified. This is pushing more capital to
the sidelines, which may eventually benefit
commercial real estate once the worst of the
economic issues pass.
Commercial Real Estate Financing
High-profile defaults – primarily highly leveraged deals that closed at the market’s peak – should be
differentiated from otherwise healthy fundamentals and low delinquency rates among most core,
Main Street commercial real estate assets. Overall, commercial mortgage delinquency rates remain
near record lows but are expected to rise, reflecting weakness in the economy. As a result, there will
be additional distress; however, assuming financial markets begin to normalize, the magnitude of the
downturn should not be severe enough to cause wholesale distress in the commercial real estate
market.
Capital remains constrained, with borrower requirements and underwriting adjusting to increased
risk in the marketplace. Debt-service coverage ratios have increased to 1.25x to 1.30x and
downpayment requirements have increased to an average of 30 percent to 45 percent. These
indicators are in line with long-term averages; however, lenders have become extremely sensitive to
quality.

Tighter lending standards will prevail over the
foreseeable future, and spreads are expected to
remain volatile through the next several
quarters.
- After the Lehman and Merrill Lynch
announcements, portfolio lender spreads for
apartment properties increased 30 to 40
basis points, then rose another 20 to 25 basis
points when the initial EESA failed to pass a
House vote; they currently range from 275
to 300 basis points over the 10-year
Treasury. Apartments are a bright spot in
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s portfolios,
and the agencies continue to lend on quality deals. Agency fixed-rate spreads have also risen since
the Lehman and Merrill Lynch announcements to 275 to 300 basis points over the 10-year
Treasury.
- Best-of-class retail assets are able to garner financing at around 300 basis points over the 10-year
Treasury. Lending rates are up roughly 40 basis points from before the Lehman and Merrill Lynch
announcements for less-desirable retail properties, with the average currently around 345 basis
points over the 10-year Treasury.
- Since the Lehman and Merrill Lynch announcements, office loan spreads have increased
approximately 25 to 30 basis points, ranging from 300 to 345 basis points over the 10-year
Treasury. Markets with high concentrations of financial services positions will face added scrutiny
among lenders.
Impact on Commercial Real Estate Market
In the short term, further economic weakness will
be reflected in higher vacancies. However, limited
construction during the past cycle should keep
vacancy rates below prior-peak levels, with the
exception of retail, assuming the downturn is not
significantly deeper or longer than expected.
Longer term, the dropoff in construction activity
and an economic recovery should bring
commercial real estate supply and demand back
into balance.

Market and submarket selection are critical in the
current environment. In New York City and other
financial centers, office owners will experience
reduced demand for office space, and Wall Street
job losses are likely to negatively impact other commercial real estate sectors. For New York City, the
effects will be most pronounced Downtown. Direct job losses from the Lehman bankruptcy and the
takeover of Merrill Lynch could total 15,000 financial services positions in New York City alone.
Ultimately, each Wall Street position eliminated could translate to the loss of an additional two to
three jobs for the New York City economy. Fortunately, New York City has become one of the
tightest markets globally, entering this downturn with strong fundamentals.
Bankruptcies and mergers among financial institutions are intensifying the office market downturn. Financial activities employment accounted for 6 percent of all jobs as of August 2008, which is in line
with the long-term average. The most recent period of significant contraction in the sector occurred as a
result of the dot-com bust and 9/11 tragedies, when financial activities payrolls slipped to 5.8 percent of
total nonfarm employment. From 2000 to 2002, the U.S. office vacancy rate nearly doubled to 16 percent.
However, this period was not only marked by the
dot-com bust but also significant levels of
contraction following the late-1990s economic
boom.

If financial activities’ share of total employment
drifts back down to 2001 levels, this would translate
into the loss of another 236,000 positions in the
sector. Markets other than New York City with high
concentrations of financial sector jobs include
Jacksonville, Charlotte, San Francisco, Salt Lake
City, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Dallas/Fort Worth, Fort
Lauderdale, Tampa, Denver, Columbus, Orange
County, San Antonio and Philadelphia.
The current environment is marked by a flight to safety among lenders and investors.
Lenders are
increasing equity requirements as concerns regarding defaults and declining property values
intensify, creating a gap between high-quality assets and markets, and lower-tier investments. Cap
rates for higher-quality assets in primary markets have moved up the least, while the most
adjustment has been among lower-tier properties in secondary and tertiary markets and submarkets.
The credit crunch and expanding buyer/seller expectations gap are hindering transaction velocity and
will further pressure prices in the short term; however, tighter financing is also resulting in a
significant dropoff in construction starts.
Although the Fed has expanded its lending facilities,
allowing institutions to use a broader range of collateral when borrowing from the central bank,
many banks remain hesitant to lend and are maintaining capital to shore up balance sheets. As a
result, the financing climate is expected to remain tight, limiting the availability of capital for
commercial property transactions and new construction. Insurance companies are also likely to face
capacity limitations, further reducing capital flows into the sector.
High-profile Wall Street assets that may be distressed comprise a small share of the overall market.
There is still some uncertainty regarding the future for Lehman Brothers and AIG’s real estate-related
assets. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of the real estate transactions that Lehman provided
equity or debt capital for since 2001 took place from 2005 to 2007, representing $31.5 billion of assets.
The majority of Lehman’s activity during this time period was in Washington, D.C., Reno, Los
Angeles, Atlanta, Boston and Manhattan. Prices peaked during this period, potentially resulting in
discounting if the assets must be liquidated quickly. The bulk of the troubled portion of these
portfolios are related to residential real estate and commercial paper.
There is a significant difference between "distressed" assets and the vast majority of properties that
report healthy occupancies and cash flows.
Of particular concern are owner-occupied and singletenant
properties, particularly in secondary/tertiary markets, which have become more vulnerable to
owner/tenant defaults, as many small- to mid-sized companies have been hit hard by the freezing of
the commercial paper market. Additionally, distress is more likely among high-leverage deals closed
at the market’s peak, failed conversions and speculative development projects.
There is plenty of equity in the market, as commercial real estate values doubled from 1997 to
2007, and a substantial volume of cash remains on the sidelines. Beyond the current financial
market turbulence, investors will be looking to redeploy capital.
The price expectations gap
between commercial real estate buyers and sellers will take time to narrow. However, the
sector’s advantages as a hard-asset class with favorable long-term returns, an inflation hedge
and relative stability against an extremely volatile stock market will attract a new round of
capital. More clarity on the economic direction and redefined pricing will have to materialize as
precursors for the emergence of this next cycle.
Recent Events Summary
Charlotte-based Wachovia, which is suffering from heavy mortgage-related losses and a falling
stock price, has reportedly accepted an offer from Wells Fargo after rejecting an earlier bid from
Citigroup to acquire its banking operations.
Banking industry woes are spreading across the globe,
with two major European financial institutions failing in recent days. Government action has become
more swift, with the European Union choosing to allow individual countries to act.
Failure of the initial EESA to pass a House vote placed additional strain on the economy and
financial markets.
Failure of the original bill sent financial markets into a tailspin; at the end of the
trading day, the DJIA had lost nearly 780 points, its greatest single-day point loss in history, though
not the largest decline on a percentage basis. Recovery followed but more sell-offs reflect the fragility
of investor confidence.
Banks’ reluctance to lend to one another has created yet another hurdle for the financial industry
around the world, hindering normal operations.
In a well-coordinated effort, central banks have
banded together to help thaw an interbank lending freeze. In response to skyrocketing interbank
lending rates, central banks around the world are injecting liquidity into the market to ease pressure
on the already fragile banking system. Additional and more direct Fed intervention in the
commercial paper market and interbank lending may become necessary.
Seattle-based Washington Mutual was seized by the government as its mortgage-related losses
mounted, its stock price slipped and customers withdrew nearly $17 billion in deposits over a 10-day
period; the bulk of the bank’s operations have been sold to JP Morgan Chase.
Washington Mutual’s
downfall marks the largest bank failure in U.S. history, and uncertainty within the banking industry
persists.
The Wall Street investment banking industry has been fundamentally changed, as Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs will be converted into traditional bank holding companies.
The transition will
place what were the final two major Wall Street investment banks under the supervision of bank
regulators. The transition allows the firms to avoid mark-to-market accounting practices, or the
valuation of assets based on current fair market value. In today’s market, many assets have become
difficult to trade and therefore price. As a result, mark-to-market accounting can lead to significant
writedowns and add yet another layer of uncertainty for investment banks, fueling investor fear.
Furthermore, as commercial banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs will be able to rely on
funding from customer deposits.
A handful of money market funds “broke the buck,” sparking more broad-based government
intervention.
Money market mutual funds are typically among the safest investments and are
required to invest conservatively, generally in lower-risk short-term securities; however, they are not
FDIC insured. It is uncommon and alarming when a money market fund “breaks the buck,” or its net
asset value falls below $1 per share. This occurred within the past few weeks for a handful of funds,
including one of the oldest in existence, sounding yet another alarm for financial markets. To shore
up investor confidence and prevent a run on money market funds, the Treasury Department announced it would guarantee deposits in these funds, which are estimated at nearly $3.5 trillion, for
a one-year period given that the funds pay a fee to participate in the program. The guarantee only
protects existing investments, preventing the potential for mass withdrawals from commercial banks
to participate in these funds, which generally provide higher yields than standard savings accounts.
The government initially rebuffed a rescue of American Insurance Group (AIG) but reconsidered due
to potentially disastrous repercussions that the company’s failure could have on the global financial
system.
The government is providing AIG up to $85 billion in funding at a steep interest rate of 8.5
percentage points above the 3-month LIBOR, and is taking a 79.9 percent stake in the company. The
AIG credit facility has a term of 24 months and is designed to allow AIG to meet its financial
commitments while selling off several of its business units in an orderly manner.
Barclay’s agreed to purchase a large share of Lehman’s securities business.
The deal includes
Lehman’s Manhattan headquarters building and two data centers in the Northeast, and it should
provide a reprieve for 10,000 of Lehman’s 26,000 employees. However, it is unknown how many of
the 12,000-Manhattan-based positions this figure includes.
Merrill Lynch opted to accept a $50 billion offer to be acquired by Bank of America following the
government’s announcement that it would not back a rescue of Lehman.
It is unknown how many of
Merrill Lynch’s New York City-based work force will be affected, though an announcement by
Mayor Bloomberg suggested local job losses may be minimal.
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection amid mounting real estate-related
losses, resulting in significant fallout for other financial firms and exacerbating the crisis.
In the
days leading up to the announcement, the 158-year old company failed to secure much-needed
funding from foreign sources and was unable to find a buyer after the government refused financial
assistance.
The U.S. government seized control of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The collapse of
one or both of the companies would have had devastating effects on the mortgage and housing
market, in addition to the broader economy and global financial system. Combined, the governmentsponsored
enterprises hold or back $5.2 trillion in residential mortgage debt, or roughly half of the
total outstanding. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold or guarantee approximately 36 percent of
outstanding multi-family loans and have continued to fund these transactions, as their apartment
portfolios have low delinquency rates and generally conservative underwriting.
U.S. Financial Crisis: How Did We Get Here?
The financial sector deteriorated rapidly during the past few weeks, elevating the capital markets turmoil
of the past year into a crisis. Troubles have been building for some time. Given the unique and complex
nature of the current financial crisis, many investors may be asking how we ended up in this situation.
- After the Savings & Loan Crisis of the late 1980s to early 1990s, banks were required to hold more
capital on their balance sheets to insulate themselves from potential losses on riskier loans.
- The securitization of mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) gained in popularity, partly in
response to the credit crunch of the early 1990s. MBS issuers essentially repackaged mortgage loans
into securities that were sold to investors globally.
- The rapid growth of public REITs also reflected an alternative method of raising capital in the
aftermath of the early-1990s liquidity crunch.
- Following the 9/11 tragedies, the Fed acted quickly to restore confidence and liquidity to the U.S.
economy, injecting cash into the marketplace and lowering short-term rates significantly.
- The global savings glut and race for yield brought capital into U.S. Treasurys and investments from
overseas in the years that followed, lowering long-term interest rates and supporting the
government’s push to increase homeownership rates.
- The rapidly growing secondary mortgage market allowed lenders to continuously replenish capital,
pumping liquidity into the U.S. housing market and fueling the greatest housing boom in history.
- Home prices spiked in most major markets nationwide early this decade. In spite of low interest
rates, many borrowers stretched their buying power by taking out adjustable-rate loans.
Furthermore, many homeowners cashed-out considerable amounts of equity from their houses.
- As home sales and demand for MBS skyrocketed, lenders began competing aggressively to originate
new mortgages, resulting in the proliferation of riskier loan programs.
- Competition for new mortgage business led to an industrywide relaxing of underwriting standards
and a steep rise in subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending.
- Like prime mortgages, subprime loans were packaged into MBS and sold to investors, who relied on
ratings agencies to assess the risk associated with these products. Many of these mortgage pools were
mis-rated by the agencies, and the lion’s share of loans were originated under the assumption that
home prices would continue to appreciate.
- Cracks began to form in the housing market: adjustable-rate mortgages originated in recent years,
many subprime, began to reset at higher rates, sales activity started to slip, home prices edged back,
lenders tightened underwriting standards and mortgage defaults escalated dramatically.
- The cycle became self-propelling and ratings agencies slashed MBS ratings. Housing woes have since
spread beyond the subprime market, as many prime borrowers are also upside down on their
mortgages.
- Investors ultimately fled the MBS market amid mounting subprime losses and growing uncertainty,
and the securities became difficult to price or trade.
- As a result, many financial institutions have massive quantities of illiquid assets on their books,
essentially freezing the credit markets.
- Expansion of the financial crisis is resulting in a domino effect that puts the overall economy at risk.
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